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 Executive summary
 Introduction
The scoping study on the ‘International Ombuds1 for Humanitarian and Development 
Aid’ was commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a contribu-
tion to the work of the Ad Hoc Donor Technical Group on Safeguarding, set up in 
the wake of the sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment scandals that emerged in 
2018. The aim of the study was to assess whether there is a need for such a mecha-
nism and, if so, how it might function and fit with existing governance mechanisms in 
the sector 2. The study was carried out in August and September 2018 by a three-per-
son team with diverse experience, supported by a small advisory group.
The study used a qualitative methodology comprised of interviews involving 76 
participants representing different parts of the sector, including donors, host govern-
ments, the UN, INGOs, local NGOs, the Red Cross, the private sector, and persons 
with specialist knowledge relevant to the study (Annex 1). A desk review of around 
125 documents and websites was also carried out (Annex 2). The interviews solicited 
the personal views of participants rather than organisational positions; at this initial 
stage of scoping, it was important to understand whether there was a need for such 
a mechanism from experienced aid practitioners rather than to receive institutional 
responses.
The study researched a number of background issues in terms of the concept of the 
Ombuds as an institution, and particularly its classical role as an accountability tool 
enabling citizens to raise complaints about public institutions and services. It also 
looked at the history of the Ombuds idea and the evolution of complaints mecha-
nisms in the sector. The interviews explored various questions including the need for 
an Ombuds in light of existing initiatives; the way it would work in terms of scope, 
focus and role; and the challenges faced.
A review of existing mechanisms yielded a list of key characteristics, including that 
these mechanisms usually function as a last resort, serve to make recommendations 
instead of as a direct enforcement authority, publish their findings, actively reach out 
to make themselves known and proactively instigate enquiries. Key lessons identified 
from existing initiatives are the need to have a variety of methods available (face to 
face, phone, complaint boxes, help desks, etc.) and the need to be open to all com-
plaints to be responsive to the true concerns of aid recipients. A typical challenge of 
existing complaint and reporting mechanisms is low usage unless efforts are made to 
publicise the methods, to reach out to target groups and to embed such mechanisms 
in a wider portfolio of accountability measures.
1 The term ‘Ombuds’ is used in this report in place of the term ‘Ombudsman’; the term ‘Ombuds’ is commonly used 
to avoid modern-day connotations of gender bias inherent in the use of the suffix ‘man’. 
2 See Annex 3 for the Terms of Reference.
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 Findings
The key findings based on interviews and documentary review are as follows:
Need
There was a strong consensus among participants that there is a need for an Ombuds 
mechanism in the sector to provide independent recourse for complainants. Primary 
responsibility for dealing with complaints should nonetheless be retained by organisa-
tions and existing mechanisms. There was wide agreement that donor governments 
could do more to lead strengthened oversight, including by using donor conditionali-
ty to incentivise accountability to affected populations.
Authority
The Ombuds requires authority if it is to be effective. This can come from a range of 
sources such as voluntary agreement, moral pressure, donor conditions, and national 
or international law. Constituting the Ombuds within the framework of internation-
al law would give it strong authority and international reach, but this would require 
significant inter-governmental agreement. Authority derived from a mixture of donor 
conditionality, voluntary agreement and moral pressure is more readily achievable.
Organisations covered
Many participants agreed that an Ombuds can only be effective (and acceptable) 
when it applies to all aid actors in humanitarian and development settings – (I)NGOs, 
the UN and other multilaterals, the Red Cross, private organisations and donors. The 
degree of authority over different types of organisations may vary depending on the 
type of voluntary commitments or agreements between donors and funding recipi-
ents. Nonetheless, even with entities that are not covered by voluntary commitments 
or donor requirements, the Ombuds would still have the ability to make enquiries and 
assist complainants in finding pathways for complaint. In situations of chain responsi-
bility, where funding is contracted downstream from the donor through the primary 
recipient to NGO and private-sector implementing partners on the ground, the Om-
buds could particularly add value by helping ensure a coordinated response through-
out the delivery chain. It is not envisaged that the Ombuds would apply to peace-
keeping operations or national governmental authorities because of the different lines 
of accountability involving national law and institutions. Nonetheless, grey areas may 
arise, and the Ombuds may assist to the extent possible.
Issues addressed
It is widely agreed that the Ombuds needs to be open to all complaints in order to be 
responsive to the concerns of affected populations. Although it may have a priority fo-
cus, for instance, on sexual exploitation and abuse by aid workers, it needs to receive 
and then channel different types of complaints as appropriate.
Persons covered
The mechanism should be for aid recipients and affected populations rather than 
agency personnel (staff or volunteers) to raise concerns on behalf of themselves. 
The rationale is that the Ombuds should exist for those who have no other recourse, 
whereas personnel are usually covered by other mechanisms (legal contracts, trade 
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unions, organisational Ombuds, ethics offices, etc.) that should be utilised first. A 
number of participants argued that flexibility needs to be retained for dealing with 
workplace concerns on an exceptional basis.
Role
The primary role of an Ombuds is dealing with complaints. It should act, as Ombuds 
typically do, as a second-tier appeal function after internal organisational channels 
have been pursued and take a scaled problem-solving approach. Ombuds usually lack 
direct legal authority and rely on making non-binding recommendations to the organ-
isations responsible. Sanctions in the case of continued non-compliance may include 
the ability to publish findings with the consequent threat to funding and reputation.
In addition, it was identified that the Ombuds should take on a proactive role in 
terms of audits of complaints mechanisms or thematic reviews of the sector. Advi-
sory functions may include research, analysis, capacity development, convening and 
harmonisation. A second-tier reporting mechanism requires a first tier that is up and 
running in order to work to optimum effect. Much remains to be done in the sector 
in this respect, and the situation is also fluid, with new initiatives emerging in the wake 
of recent safeguarding scandals. The Ombuds may therefore need to take a staged 
approach, focusing more on a proactive role in the initial phase, which involves help-
ing, alongside other initiatives, the strengthening of first-tier complaints mechanisms. 
This can then give way incrementally to an increased focus on the responsive role of 
complaints handling.
Accessibility
The question of how affected populations would access the Ombuds was often 
raised in interviews, given issues of geographical proximity, language and cultural bar-
riers, as well as the difficulties in capturing sensitive complaints, for instance, related 
to sexual misconduct. To be directly accessible to all, an Ombuds would require a 
multiple and global presence. This, in turn, raised serious concerns about the creation 
of parallel structures and the scalability of such a model given the costs, logistics and 
complications of national jurisdiction. An international aid Ombuds limited to an inter-
national office with global- and national-level networks of supporters and the capacity 
to undertake field missions could add value if it is seen as an appeal mechanism rath-
er than a first port of call. As with all reporting mechanisms, efforts would be required 
to conduct outreach and publicise its existence to ensure utilisation. In addition, the 
Ombuds could receive complaints from others speaking on behalf of complainants 
(e.g. staff, visitors or community members), as is often the case with complaint mech-
anisms dealing with vulnerable persons.
Ownership and governance
To be successful, there is agreement that the Ombuds will need to have a multi-stake-
holder approach that includes host countries and agencies (international and local 
NGOs, multilaterals, and private organisations). If the mechanism relies on donor 
funding as one of its sources of authority, there was also broad agreement among 
participants that donors may take a key role in initiating the mechanism. When dis-
cussing structure, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the creation of something 
flexible and with a ‘light touch’. In terms of where the Ombuds should be nested, 
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various options were considered including housing the mechanism in a donor coor-
dination body, in existing sectoral coordination mechanisms, in national bodies and in 
international organisations. There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these 
options, which merit further discussion. Considerations of the cost of running an Om-
buds mechanism were not part of the initial scoping. Beyond the truism that account-
ability costs money, there was desire for a lightweight, agile structure that functions 
with a minimal secretariat and a flexible on-demand roster of specialists. The need for 
broader investment in agency or inter-agency complaint mechanisms remains para-
mount to ensure that the Ombuds can have its envisaged role as a second-tier mech-
anism.
Challenges: The research has suggested a clear need for an independent aid Ombuds 
and a direction in terms of its mandate, scope and modalities. There are also a num-
ber of key challenges in setting up and operating an Ombuds mechanism. Important 
practical challenges revolving around the logistics and administration of such a mech-
anism must be addressed, as must the management of the security of complainants 
and those involved with investigations.
A key challenge is to develop the entity in such a way that the sources of authority 
and instruments available to the Ombuds to apply pressure on agencies add up to 
ensuring proper follow-up of complaints in order to meet the expectations of those 
who muster up the courage to file a complaint.
Many legal and jurisdictional issues as well as how the Ombuds would link with 
domestic laws and relevant national authorities must be clarified. The question of 
authority will need to be addressed: From where does the authority of an Ombuds 
come? Sector-wide buy-in would be important, but the authority of the Ombuds over 
those organisations choosing not to actively support the Ombuds must be clarified. 
The right balance must be found between financial and moral incentives. Coordina-
tion with already-existing standards, mechanisms and processes should be assured. 
There are many challenges connected to the accessibility of the mechanism by aid 
recipients and in terms of how communication about the Ombuds is conducted. 
Finally, it will be a process for the Ombuds to become fully effective. Clarity about its 
role, parameters and limitations is necessary to avoid disillusion, unmet expectations 
and disappointment.
 Proposed Model
There are different possible models for an Ombuds, but the study found substantial 
convergence on how an Ombuds for the sector might best work, taking into account 
the various challenges noted above. Based on the findings, the following model of a 
Joint Sectoral International Aid Ombuds emerges as the most viable. In this model, 
the Ombuds would derive its authority from donor funding, voluntary agreement and 
moral pressure. This model is therefore more readily achievable than are systems that 
require new international legal agreements. The lack of direct authority and the reli-
ance on non-binding recommendations to organisations themselves mean that the 
mechanism would not encroach on the role of national authorities or their jurisdic-
tion. This approach proposes exercising influence and enhancing practice by optimis-
ing the pathways of accountability and complaints in the aid delivery chain. It provides 
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a collective approach to existing oversight mechanisms, such as reporting hotlines 
and complaint mechanisms, and to existing practices in terms of investigations, 
enquiries and assessments. This is not to say that other oversight models, particularly 
those which offer more direct legal authority, should not continue to be considered, 
now or in the future.
The proposed model has the capacity to combine response handling with proactive 
and advisory roles and can make recommendations that cover all types of organisa-
tions (NGOs and multilaterals) and respond to all aspects of a case (civil and criminal). 
The diagram below shows how such a model would work: nested in an internation-
al body with a governance structure comprised of all parts of the sector, operated 
through a small secretariat supported by a flexible workforce and linked to first-tier 
complaints mechanisms.
Diagram: Possible Model for International Aid Ombuds
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Small secretariat
• Receive and re-
spond to/coordi-
nate complaints
• Initiate and coor-
dinate proactive 
and advisory roles, 
including indepen-
dent research
• Network and liai-
son with in-country 
partners and exist-
ing initiatives
• Annual reporting
• Secretariat func-
tions
Roster of experts 
convened as need-
ed to carry out main 
tasks
• Reactive function: 
review cases, inves-
tigate if necessary, 
produce findings 
and recommenda-
tions
• Proactive and advi-
sory function: carry 
out thematic as-
sessments or other 
aspects of the roles 
of the Ombuds
Governance structure
donor, host country, UN, RCRC, (I)
NGO/UN, private sector
Nested in an international body
to be identified
Joint Sectoral Ombuds
National links
• Joint inter-agency 
complaint mecha-
nisms and agencies
• Individual agency 
complaint mecha-
nisms
• Ombudsman of-
fices
• Global network of 
specialists with rele-
vant education and 
skills
 Next steps
This initial scoping study has identified a need for an Ombuds for the aid sector and 
proposed a potential model that endeavours to work around the challenges facing 
the set-up and operation of such a mechanism. The testing of feasibility needs to 
continue in a further phase in terms of unpacking the mandate, structure and modali-
ties of such a body and assessing the support of stakeholders. The next stage requires 
more detailed planning but may comprise the following elements:
• Identification of a potential nesting location for the international aid Ombuds
• Further work to test and develop the proposed model in terms of its legal basis, 
organisational structure, costs, nesting, etc. 
• Assessment of the state of complaints mechanisms in the humanitarian and devel-
opment sector
• Sector consultations to garner buy-in and support within the sector
• Field work in humanitarian/development sites to further test the feasibility of the 
model
• Consider trialling a prototype of the international aid Ombuds
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PART I
Background
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1.  Introduction
The humanitarian and development sector has struggled for years over the question 
of how to be accountable to the recipients of its services and to vulnerable popula-
tions in the contexts in which it works. One idea that has been discussed since the 
1990s is the establishment of an international ombudsman as an independent com-
plaints mechanism. In the context of recent safeguarding scandals involving sexual 
exploitation, abuse and harassment by personnel working for NGOs, the UN and the 
Red Cross3, the idea has again been revived with questions asked as to whether the 
sector needs an independent body to oversee the handling of complaints. This study 
was commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a contribution to 
the work of the Ad Hoc Donor Technical Working Group on Safeguarding, set up in 
the wake of recent events in order to assess whether there is a need for such a body, 
and, if so, how it might function and fit with governance mechanisms in the sector.4
At the start of this study, we used the term ‘Ombudsman’ in accordance with the orig-
inal Swedish mechanism, where the term umbudsman meant ‘representative’. How-
ever, as our interviews progressed, we found that the suffix ‘man’ is seen as gender-bi-
ased. In this report, we therefore use the commonly used term ‘Ombuds’, without a 
suffix.
1.1 Problem statement
The scandals about sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment in the aid sector this 
year have drawn global attention and criticism. Aid agencies set up to ‘do good’ were 
found also to be affected by the sexual abuse that pervades all walks of life and that 
has increasingly been brought to light in recent years through ‘#MeToo’. The heart 
of the public outrage lies not in the fact that individual aid workers were exploiting or 
abusing vulnerable people, but in organisations’ failure to take prompt and effective 
action to sanction offenders and stop further abuses. The core problem that the Om-
buds thus seeks to address is how organisations can be required to take all reasonable 
steps to prevent and respond to abuse, and how an Ombuds, as an independent en-
tity overseeing the way organisations deal with the concerns of victims/survivors, can 
provide the ongoing stimulus for correction.
The issue of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment is currently the focus of much 
attention: The UN launched a revitalized comprehensive strategy in 20175 (prior to the 
current spate of scandals), and NGOs6 and donors have strengthened their activities 
with a Global Safeguarding Conference scheduled to take place in October 2018 to 
seal commitments to tackling this issue. However, as the United Kingdom Internation-
al Development Committee Parliamentary Inquiry into Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
in the Aid Sector recently concluded, this level of response cannot be guaranteed 
3 Times newspaper, 21 February 2018; Guardian newspaper, 25 January 2018
4 See Annex 3 for the Terms of Reference
5 UN, 2017, A/71/818 and A/71/818/Corr.1
6 Ammerschuber, L. and Schenk, E., September 2017; InterAction, 2018.
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once the spotlight has faded, noting in particular that the issue had been on the glob-
al policy agenda since the West African sex-for-aid scandal in 20027: 
The aid sector, collectively, has been aware of sexual exploitation and abuse 
by its own personnel for years, but the attention that it has given to the pro-
blem has not matched the challenge. Repeatedly, reports of sexual exploitati-
on and abuse by aid workers and/or peacekeepers have emerged, the sector 
has reacted, but then the focus has faded. This episodic response has led to 
the existence of safeguarding policies and procedures that have never been 
effectively implemented. This has meant that where worthwhile safeguarding 
measures have been developed, they have never been adequately funded. A 
reactive, cyclical approach, driven by concern for reputational management 
has not, and will never, bring about meaningful change.8
Although the current scandals highlight one particular type of abuse in terms of sexual 
misconduct, there are, of course, other ways in which aid recipients suffer harm at 
the hands of aid workers for which they may wish to seek recourse. The challenge for 
addressing this falls on the entire aid chain: the donors that use funds, usually collect-
ed from tax payers, to pass on to public international organisations, NGOs or private 
agencies that are often working in partnership with local organisations to deliver ser-
vices to poverty- and crisis-affected populations.
The particular problem faced by aid recipients who have been subjected to miscon-
duct by aid agency personnel is the lack of any meaningful form of recourse. Inci-
dents of sexual misconduct are notoriously difficult to address in all societies because 
of the surrounding stigma and under-reporting, coupled with challenges in investiga-
tion, sanction and redress. The difficulties are further compounded in contexts that 
have suffered from conflict or disaster triggered by natural hazards and where exist-
ing legal systems or traditional structures may have been weakened. The conduct in 
question may or may not amount to a crime and thus requires a tailored approach 
that considers the full spectrum of civil and/or criminal investigations and sanctions.
For example, in a country with a functioning rule of law, the abuse of a child by a 
teacher may lead to various outcomes – the teacher may be prosecuted for a crim-
inal offence and/or be dismissed from the job; he or she may be disciplined by the 
professional regulator and be barred from teaching for life; or the teacher, school, and 
education authorities may be sued for damages. In an equivalent example of a child 
being abused by a teacher working for an international aid programme in a context 
where the rule of law has broken down, recourse in practice is often limited to the 
organisation, as the employer, sanctioning the offender. Of course, this is one exam-
ple; in practice, there are many variables in terms of the institutional context, victims/
survivors and perpetrators, as shown by recent cases with more or fewer options for 
recourse available.
7 UNHCR/Save the Children, 2002
8 International Development Committee (IDC), UK Parliament, ‘Summary’ (2018)
1.2  Methodology
The study used a qualitative methodology comprised of documentary review (see Annex 
2) and interviews via Skype or in person. Approximately 60 meetings were held, with a 
total of 76 participants, and around 125 documents and websites were reviewed. Several 
confidential and/or sensitive documents were reviewed but are not listed in the referenc-
es list.
The participants were mainly purposefully identified, and snowballing techniques were 
also used to identify further contributors. Interviews were held with 76 participants from 
across the sector. These included representatives of donors, host governments, the UN, 
INGOs, NGOs from different geographical areas, the Red Cross, and the private sector as 
well as persons with specialist knowledge relevant to the study – for instance, from past 
experience with an earlier Ombudsman study. Annex 1 provides a list of the names and 
current affiliations of the interviewees. The interviews were adapted to each interviewee 
and usually comprised two aspects: brainstorming questions aimed at exploring the idea 
and tailored questions that tapped into specialised knowledge. The starting point for the 
interviews was assessing the need for an independent body to oversee the handling of 
complaints, followed by an exploration of how this might work if it were to be set up.
The interviews were carried out on a confidential basis and solicited the personal views 
of interviewees and not organisational positions. This was because, at this initial stage of 
scoping, the study team sought to understand the need for such a mechanism by talking 
to experienced aid practitioners rather than to receive responses filtered through vested 
institutional interests. The study was carried out in August and September 2018. Initial 
findings were shared with the Ad Hoc Donor Technical Working Group on Safeguard-
ing at a meeting on 7 September 2018, with a view to finalising the report by the end of 
September 2018.
The team working on this report has a diverse background. The study sought to mitigate 
potential bias in the research team by ensuring a diverse team composition, also in terms 
of their previous exposure to the idea of an aid Ombuds. Interviews were carried out 
separately by different members of the team to enable triangulation and the validation of 
findings. The members of the team were as follows:
• Dorothea Hilhorst is a professor of humanitarian aid and reconstruction at ISS. She 
has done extensive research on humanitarian aid in many settings, and one of her 
focus areas is humanitarian accountability. She is also an independent board member 
of the Core Humanitarian Standard Alliance.
• Asmita Naik is an independent consultant in international development specialised in 
human rights/protection including sexual exploitation and abuse. She is a lawyer and 
holds positions on various regulatory bodies. She acted as core team member in this 
study.
• Andrew Cunningham is an independent consultant in the humanitarian field. He 
worked for many years managing programmes in response to humanitarian crises, 
mostly with Médecins Sans Frontières. His PhD research focused on humanitarian 
governance and state–NGO relations.
The team was assisted by a small advisory group, which commented on the draft report.
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2. What is an ombuds?
The modern institution of the ombudsman originates in Sweden with the establish-
ment of an independent office as far back as the 16th and 17th centuries to safeguard 
the rights of citizens and to ensure that officials acted in accordance with the laws. 
Scholars argue that a prototype of the ombudsman function can be found even fur-
ther back in history in the Roman and Turkish empires as well as in ancient China in 
the form of inspectors reporting directly to rulers on the conduct of officials towards 
the populace. The term ‘ombudsman’ carries gender connotations in modern-day lin-
guistics that are not inherent in the etymology of the Scandinavian word. Modern-day 
variations of this term include ‘ombud’, ‘ombuds’9, and ‘ombudsperson’.
The Ombuds mechanism has been adopted by most countries in the world and 
usually refers to a state official appointed to provide a check on government activity in 
the interests of the citizen, and in particular to oversee the investigation of complaints 
of improper government activity. The office may carry a different title such as Public 
Complaints Commission or be absorbed into other roles such as Inspector General, 
Citizen Advocate or National Human Rights Institution.
The typical duty of an Ombuds is to investigate complaints and attempt to resolve 
them through recommendations or mediation. The role is usually advisory unless it is 
given the authority under national law to make binding recommendations, to initi-
ate legal proceedings or to prosecute. Ombuds may also identify systematic issues 
leading to poor service or breaches of people’s rights. At the national level, Ombuds 
often have a wide mandate to deal with the entire public sector and sometimes also 
elements of the private sector (for example, contracted service providers). More re-
cent developments include the creation of specialised Ombuds to cover, for instance, 
services for children or data protection.
The advantage of the mechanism is that it is independent and avoids the conflict 
of interest inherent in self-policing. Conversely, the disadvantage is the lack of di-
rect authority and the reliance on the cooperation of those it investigates to provide 
information and to then implement its recommendations. This study found the same 
arguments applied to the mechanism’s application in the aid sector (see Part 2).
Nonetheless, the mechanism is widely used across the world. There are now differ-
ent strands in this usage. The term continues to be used in its classical sense as an 
accountability system for public institutions and services. In addition, there are many 
organisational Ombuds mechanisms, for example in corporations, universities and 
sometimes aid agencies, serving as an internal dispute resolution mechanism for 
employees. The model is thus flexible and adaptable, but the core of the idea is the 
independent handling of complaints with the key attributes of the system being inde-
pendence, impartiality, neutrality and confidentiality.
9 This term is mainly used to refer to organisational Ombuds but is used in this study to refer to the 
Classical model of accountability for public services.
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Ombuds are also linked internationally through several networking and umbrella 
bodies; the International Ombudsman Institute is the most important for linking 
to public Ombuds organisations around the world. There are also development 
projects aimed at strengthening ombudsman institutions around the world, for 
instance the National Ombudsman for the Netherlands.
2.1  Typical characteristics
An examination of the ways different Ombuds work suggests some typical oper-
ational approaches that provide important guidance for an International Aid Om-
buds, namely: 
• Functioning as a mechanism of last resort after the complainant has worked 
through existing complaints mechanisms;
• Can instigate enquiries and does not need to wait for complaints;
• Publishing findings (some take the approach of publishing findings on all cases, 
whatever the outcome; others publish cases where there is an adverse finding 
against an organisation or where the matter remains unresolved);
• Requiring efforts to make themselves known and accessible (variety of meth-
ods used, such as phone, online letter, Twitter, Facebook and audible websites). 
Accessibility for vulnerable groups is addressed through tailored methods and by 
allowing others to make a complaint on behalf of a vulnerable person;
• Acting as a backstop and deferring to legal recourse, which means not taking on 
a case if a legal process is ongoing or sometimes referring cases for legal action 
if better served through those channels;
• Making recommendations but not having direct enforcement authority to re-
quire action be taken against individuals or organisations; and
• Filtering out relevant complaints and having processes for dealing with mali-
cious complaints.
3.  History of the humanitarian ombudsman 
the idea of a humanitarian ombudsman was previously explored in a very different 
context in the late 1990s, in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide. It emerged 
as a recommendation of the 1994 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to 
Rwanda, which highlighted the poor performance of aid agencies and the lack 
of coordination and accountability, and proposed an ombudsman function as a 
solution. The idea was discussed at the 1999 World Disasters Forum, leading to the 
establishment of a two-year feasibility study implemented by the British Red Cross 
and funded by the Department for International Development (DFID). The study 
looked at the feasibility of an ombudsman mechanism in humanitarian contexts 
and conducted field trials in three locations. It concluded that an ombudsman was 
feasible despite various legal/jurisdictional obstacles and other challenges.
A core principle of the original initiative was to be a ‘voice for beneficiaries and 
eyes for agencies’ on aid accountability. A key objective was to make proposals 
and recommendations for improving the overall quality of humanitarian aid deliv-
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ery. Therefore, codes of practice such as the Sphere Standards and the Code of Con-
duct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster 
Relief were to be the key references. This iteration of the ombudsman idea, however, 
seems to have been focused more on communities than on individual aid recipients. 
Another key element the initiative proposed was the voluntary nature of the scheme 
– organisations were to be free to sign on to the scheme or not. One issue during 
the pilot was the question of how much the ombudsman would be linked to national 
authorities. Some viewed their role as the default – if the national authorities had the 
capacity to perform the duties of the ombudsman, then they should be allowed to 
and would be supported to build capacity to take on that role over time. In this view, 
the ombudsman mechanism would be handed over to national authorities as quickly 
as possible. Identified challenges included beneficiary access, balancing facilitation 
and regulation, international jurisdiction and consensus, and financing.10
The Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) was established in 2000 with the aim 
of trialling the ombudsman structure, but, after further field work and discussions 
within the sector, the original idea of the ombudsman morphed into a self-regulatory 
and standard-setting initiative. This happened for a variety of reasons: 
• An independent on-the-ground body was not seen as scalable, given the costs 
involved in setting up operations covering so many different organisations and 
contexts;
• The challenges of underpinning such a body with legal authority in places where 
the rule of law had broken down;
• A positive argument about the need for moral responsibility to be held within or-
ganisations themselves;
• A negative resistance and defensiveness regarding the idea of external scrutiny, 
particularly from larger organisations; and
• Buy in to the initiative was largely limited to NGOs because donors were not very 
involved and the UN remained detached.
By 2002, the ombudsman idea was lost in favour of voluntary self-regulation in the 
form of the HAP. The West African ‘sex-for-aid’ scandal hit the headlines in 2002 and 
highlighted chronic gaps in the accountability of aid agencies, implicating personnel 
from 40 aid agencies and nine peacekeeping battalions across three West African 
countries in acts of sexual exploitation 11, but, by this point, the direction towards 
self-regulation was already set.
HAP continued to develop in the 2000s, in terms of standards for humanitarian oper-
ations and an external verification process. It also joined with other initiatives, namely 
Sphere and People in Aid, to become part of the Joint Standards Initiative. In Decem-
ber 2014, the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) was launched in Copenhagen. In 
2015, HAP and People in Aid merged to form the CHS Alliance. The copyright of the 
standard is held by the CHS Alliance, Sphere and Groupe URD. The CHS is both a vol-
untary and a verifiable standard, and agencies can opt to undergo third-party verifica-
10 This is a composite characterisation of the first Humanitarian Ombudsman initiative based on a com-
plete review of the original documentation as listed in the reference list.
11 UNHCR/Save the Children UK, 2002
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tion carried out by an independent organisation. Currently, the Humanitarian Quality 
Assurance Initiative (HQAI) is the only organisation providing this service.
The current exploration of the ombudsman idea takes place in a very different land-
scape. The sector now has a plethora of standards, aside from the CHS, there are oth-
er initiatives such as the Accountable Now ‘Global Standard for CSO Accountability’ 
and specific standards such as the Inter-agency Standing Committee Minimum Oper-
ating Standards on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. The sector now 
also has the benefit of a long experience in the implementation of self-regulation. It 
is worth noting that the UN and other multilaterals have been on a similar journey of 
strengthening internal regulation.
These developments towards self-regulation are important but do not replace the 
need for an independent complaint mechanism. On the contrary, self-regulation is 
a critical precondition for a functioning independent mechanism. Overall, although 
self-regulation in any kind of organisation is a critical first and ongoing step, recent 
scandals raise the question of whether these are enough or whether accountability 
gaps remain.
4.  Complaints mechanisms in aid programmes
accountability mechanisms in the sector have been emphasising the importance 
of feedback and complaints mechanisms since the early 2000s. The importance 
of community participation and consultation has continued to be reinforced since 
then, most recently in 2016 UN World Humanitarian Summit and 2016 Grand Bargain 
commitments. Uptake has been slow over the years, and data show that progress on 
the CHS commitment related to complaints handling scores lower than the other 
commitments.12 Nonetheless, there is a visible and growing emphasis on complaints 
mechanisms in recent years. This is also driven by other developments that have 
required organisations to pay greater attention to the consequences of delivery and 
supply chain issues.13
• Many UN, (I)NGO and private sector organisations now have reporting lines com-
prised of websites, emails and phone numbers. Some use outsourced whistle-blo-
wing hotlines; others operate their own reporting tools. Some donor governments 
have strengthened their oversight of complaints by ensuring grant agreements in-
clude strong mandatory reporting requirements (including enabling staff and aid re-
cipients to report concerns directly) and by reserving the right to investigate com-
plaints and in some cases the right to direct remedial action (e.g. the reinstatement 
12 See, for example, CHS Alliance, 2018 ‘Evaluations against the CHS’, which shows the least compliance on Com-
mitment 5, related to complaints handling, as compared with the other eight commitments. In addition, see Times 
newspaper article, 29 May 2018, which reviews how 13 aid agencies implicated in the 2002 West Africa sex-for-aid 
scandal deal with complaints on sexual exploitation and abuse and finds less than a handful have credible systems 
for reporting and dealing with concerns.
13 For instance, in the UK, the passing of the Modern Slavery Act in 2015.
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of whistle-blowers). The USAID reporting mechanism14 is said to receive thousands 
of reports each year, including directly from aid recipients on the ground. This is 
made possible by the use of a variety of reporting methods (phone/WhatsApp, 
email, post, etc.) as well as outreach work on the ground (talks with staff and aid 
recipients during country visits) and requirements that grantees publicise reporting 
lines through, for example, posters in delivery settings such as hospitals and leaflets 
in aid packages. To date, these donor reporting lines have mainly emphasised fraud 
and corruption, but sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) is also becoming a priority 
following recent scandals. 
• Work has been done to develop the concept of Joint Inter-agency Complaints 
Mechanisms as well as Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) net-
works as part of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Policies, standard operating 
procedures and good practices have been developed to enable agencies to work 
together in establishing joint mechanisms in common settings such as camps. In 
addition, a Common Reporting Platform,15 a database to record and track SEA alle-
gations, has also been developed. The policy was signed off at high level in 201516 
and continues to be rolled out. The mechanisms are said to be established in all 
locations with peacekeeping and peace operations, in addition to other formal 
complaint mechanisms. The extent to which these mechanisms are operational 
in humanitarian settings is not known; feedback obtained by this study indicates 
that implementation depends on the lead provided by humanitarian coordinators 
in specific contexts,17 the cooperation of individual agencies and the availability of 
funding and technical expertise. 
• There are examples of well-developed systems of Ombuds-type mechanisms in 
the sector. For instance, the International Financial Institutions have a number of 
bodies, operational since the 1990s, that give voice to communities affected by lar-
ge-scale infrastructure projects, such as the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman and 
the World Bank Inspection Panel.18 Perhaps most similar to the function envisaged 
here is the CHS Alliance Complaints Board, which accepts complaints from any 
individual or entity about a CHS Alliance member organisation failing to adhere to 
CHS commitments or about concerns regarding a staff member in a CHS Alliance 
member organisation who has engaged in an act of SEA against an aid recipient. Its 
modus operandi involves working with organisations that have been complained 
about to resolve issues; in its experience, all complaints have been resolved colla-
boratively without recourse to the ultimate sanction, which is removal of member-
ship by the CHS Alliance Board. The mechanism receives very few complaints, less 
14 USAID website
15 IOM, 2016, Final Report p. 9
16 IASC Principals Meeting, Final Summary Record and Action Points, 11 December 2015, ‘2) Fully implement the 
Minimum Operating Standards, including by developing operational tools and clear guidance for the field on 
agency commitments and activities to protect against sexual exploitation and abuse, both at the institutional and 
collective levels. This requires ensuring that global standard operating procedures on cooperation in inter-agency 
complaints mechanisms, and specifically on SEA case referrals and follow-up, are developed and endorsed by May 
2016’.
17 See, for example, IOM, 2016, Final report, p. 14 which says: ‘Securing sufficient support from senior management 
to prioritize implementation of PSEA activities is likewise a universal challenge’.
18 CAO, 2000
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than a handful a year,19 and these are mainly from staff members raising workplace 
issues. The reason for the limited number of complaints is not known and may be 
explained by the lack of publicity about the mechanism. 
• Organisational Ombuds, available to staff and other personnel, are also found in 
the sector; most UN agencies have such a mechanism, GAVI and the Global Fund 
have recently set up a joint Ombuds,20 and the ICRC Ombuds function has expan-
ded in recent years to reach 18,000 colleagues through outposts in three regional 
offices and the inclusion of this function into some regular posts, with involved 
staff members contributing 10 per cent of their time to outreach and the promoti-
on of the Ombuds function.
4.1  Key learning from existing complaint mechanisms
Interview participants who have worked intensively with complaints mechanisms over 
the years highlighted the following key learning points: 
• The need to have a variety of methods available (face to face, phone, complaint 
boxes, help desks, etc); 
• Being open to all complaints, both to be responsive to the true concerns of aid re-
cipients and to enable better reporting of sensitive complaints, for instance, so that 
victims/survivors of SEA do not feel exposed or stigmatised by reporting through 
exclusive channels. Feedback is usually channelled accordingly (e.g. programme 
complaints to monitoring and evaluation/programme teams and safeguarding 
issues for close tracking by responsible persons);
• Concerns about SEA are most likely to come forward through face-to-face contact 
and through the appointment of focal points at ground level; and
• A typical challenge for all such mechanisms of reporting, whether they are Om-
buds or reporting hotlines, is low usage unless efforts are made to publicise the 
methods, to conduct outreach among target groups and to embed such mecha-
nisms in a wider portfolio of accountability measures.21
19 CHS annual reports for 2015 and 2016
20 GAVI/Global Fund, 2018
21 Schenck A, Zinsser J, (2014) p.29
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PART II
Findings on the
international 
ombuds
Part II of this report comprises the findings of the study. It reflects information, opinions 
and suggestions from the interviews and also draws on information obtained from the 
review of secondary sources. The interviews dealt with questions about the need for an 
International Aid Ombuds and its possible added value to enhance appropriate responses 
to abuse in the aid sector. The interviews further aimed to collect ideas on what such an 
Ombuds could look like, how it could be positioned in the sector and how it would work in 
practice.
5.  Response to the idea 
the need for an Ombuds-type mechanism was clearly felt by the large majority of inter-
viewees. Self-policing was considered by many to be ineffective, and some thought it had 
never worked in practice. Thus, there was a need for a mechanism capable of providing 
recourse to complainants. Linked with this, a common theme in the interviews was that 
complaint mechanisms and safeguarding policies were merely ‘box-ticking’ exercises and 
that there was a need for ‘moral’ pressure on organisations to go beyond policy develop-
ment. For many, this implied a need for a sector-wide culture change, which would ne-
cessitate external oversight and support to help ensure better adherence to principles and 
standards.
Many viewed the Ombuds from an ethical perspective in that it would give affected pop-
ulations the ability to raise concerns about aid providers. As one stakeholder put it, ‘It 
instinctively feels right that there should be recourse for the citizens of the world’. It was 
also mentioned that an independent mechanism could potentially provide a clear point of 
reference for people who wish to raise a concern, but who may not be able to find their 
way through organisation-based mechanisms or have no trust in an organisation whose 
staff have committed the abuse. Another reason for supporting the idea was the percep-
tion among some that the sector is falling behind in terms of external regulation. As one 
person explained, 
Compared to other industries, like mining or banking, we look dinosaurish. Also 
compared to the professions in which we are embedded like health and law. They 
are all very ahead.
The need for an independent aid Ombuds is underpinned by observations that internal 
regulations have not proven to be enough. Such mechanisms alone were seen as insuffi-
cient because of their inherent lack of independence. They were sometimes seen as overly 
bureaucratic and institutional or as suffering from the arbitrary application of agreed pol-
icies and procedures, which depends on the decisions of individuals. As one interviewee 
highlighted, there is an inevitable conflict of interest in organisations policing themselves:
International commitments have been made, but there is no serious effort to 
translate them into practice, there is very obvious inertia especially among [aid 
agencies] to change something that affects their power and budgets and their 
dominance, the individual institutional self-interest is overriding and there is no 
serious transformation from within.
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Some interviewees went further and talked of a ‘culture of cover-up’ holding back 
accountability. 
A small number of interviewees felt that existing approaches were enough and did not 
see the added value of an Ombuds. They conceded that current mechanisms were 
not being adequately supported or implemented and wanted to invest more in un-
derstanding and resolving why these mechanisms do not work properly: ‘We need to 
step back and ask what is stopping that from working’.
Some participants were unsure about the need for a new mechanism. They rec-
ognised the necessity of additional measures (such as a joint whistle-blowing mecha-
nism, capacity building, support in investigations and avenues to enable affected peo-
ple’s voices to be heard) but were uncertain as to whether these measures amounted 
to an Ombuds.
5.1  Cautionary notes
Although a good idea in theory, a key challenge of establishing an International Aid 
Ombuds is ensuring sector-wide support. Some respondents cautioned that organi-
sations may not support such a mechanism if they prioritise reputation22 and funding 
above more principled arguments and see external oversight as a potential threat 
to institutional interests. It is also worth highlighting that the documentary review 
showed some advocacy groups do not regard an Ombuds mechanism as an ade-
quate substitute for accessible legal remedies.23
Other cautionary responses included the fear of over-institutionalising the concept – 
Would a new mechanism simply become another layer of box-ticking or lead to more 
bureaucracy? The idea of mission creep was also raised, as structures of all types tend 
to expand their role over time. In relation to mission creep, there was also a caution 
that an aidOmbuds may bypass national judiciary systems.
Finally, as one humanitarian manager said, having such a mechanism in place may 
lead to the idea that ‘if nothing is heard, it means nothing more needs to be done’. In 
other words, organisations may feel that they are doing an adequate job if no com-
plaints are made. Linked to this was concern about the moral hazard implicit in the 
construction. Without mitigation, some organisations could take the perspective that 
the Ombuds mechanism would take care of cases on their behalf.
22 See also concerns about emphasis by organisations on protecting their reputations expressed by UK 
Parliament/IDC, 2018 ‘Summary’ – ‘But fundamental culture change is required to channel organisa-
tional energy into taking care of victims and tackling perpetrators rather than taking care of reputa-
tions and tackling whistleblowers.’
23 Aids Free World, 31 July 2018, BAI 2018
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5.2 Complementary function
 Interviewees were clear that the Ombuds needs to leave the primary responsibility to or-
ganisations themselves. It is the primary responsibility of agencies to prevent and address 
abuse. Those who supported the idea recognised that an Ombuds is not a ‘silver bullet’; 
it needs to be part of a raft of measures aimed at prevention and response – an addi-
tional tool that fits with other initiatives. As one person said, ‘[It] strikes me that it is not 
either/or […] we should be thinking about a set of complementary options which offer 
checks and balances at different levels.’
An important challenge for the Ombuds is to ensure that it works in a way that bol-
sters existing initiatives, such as individual complaints mechanisms, joint inter-agency 
complaints mechanisms under the Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC), the CHS 
and various other initiatives, rather than supplanting them. It was stated that all actors 
involved in the aid chain must continue to be open to improve and innovate account-
ability practices such as joint complaint mechanisms. There are many ways in which 
operational agencies can work together better, and donors should be prepared to 
respond positively to such initiatives. In addition, support for initiatives that specifically 
exist to raise awareness of rights and carry out consultations of aid recipients (for in-
stance, the Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities Network, Transparen-
cy International and Ground Truth) was also highlighted. Whereas some called for links 
to be formalised by the creation of information streams between organisations and 
the possible Ombuds, others pointed out the logistical complexities in making links at 
every level, given the incalculable number of different organisations and contexts.
Regulators and donor governments stressed the importance of ensuring that the 
mechanism did not overwrite regulatory interests or cede the authority ascribed in 
grant agreements to individual donors. Moreover, as regulatory standards vary enor-
mously across the world, the Ombuds would have to navigate a path through existing 
mechanisms and channels of redress on a case-by-case basis; this in itself is an import-
ant aid to a complainant, who may not, on their own, be able to find such pathways of 
complaint.
A distinction was made by several respondents between using pre-existing codes of 
practice versus the creation of new benchmarks. There are a wide variety of codes 
and standards available, and participants generally agreed on a preference to build on 
existing standards and better utilise these in practice. Stressed by many, however, was 
the view that principles, values and norms were more central to accountability mecha-
nisms than were technical standards, particularly concerning PSEA.
5.3 Need for more donor engagement
Although the primary responsibility for preventing and addressing abuse lies with 
agencies and requires commitment from the whole sector, interviewees unequivocally 
expressed a need for donor governments to do more to lead strengthened oversight 
and accountability in the sector:
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[…] We should not shy away from asking more from bilateral donors; they have 
the resources and ability to show leadership and drive meaningful and sustaina-
ble change. 
There was a broad consensus that donors could play a constructive role in helping to give 
a voice to recipients at the end of the aid chain. There was frustration that donors, as a 
whole, did not appear to invest in or incentivise accountability initiatives.
Many interviewees thought that donors should be prepared to provide both necessary 
funding and support to organisations as they work towards improving their systems of 
complaint and response (i.e. setting up individual agency complaints mechanisms and 
participating in joint inter-agency complaints mechanisms, where they exist). They sug-
gested donors use their leverage to encourage the introduction of and compliance with 
these mechanisms. This could mean, for example, asking more critical questions when re-
viewing grant applications and project reports. In addition, donors could foster adherence 
to accountability mechanisms, including a potential Ombuds if one was set up, by making 
compliance a condition of funding. As one person put it,
If only donors would start asking questions of the UN and NGOs and not be 
satisfied with a two-paragraph answer; they need to have procedures in place so 
that they can ask deeper questions.
Furthermore, donors would need to assert their influence to enhance accountability 
throughout the entire implementing sector, including the UN, the Red Cross, (I)NGOs and 
the private sector, rather than only target parts of the sector:
 […] Donors have a tendency to be stronger with the weak and weaker with the 
strong and less demanding of the UN than they are with NGOs, even though 
most of financial flows goes to the UN.
6.  Authority options of an international aid 
 ombuds
A critical challenge for the International Aid Ombuds is from where it would draw its 
authority. As many participants observed, without some form of power over the organi-
sations it aims to oversee, the Ombuds would, in effect, be nothing more than a ‘paper 
tiger’. The Ombuds’ authority could come from a range of sources, ranging from volun-
tary agreement or moral pressure through to national or international laws.
The question of authority must be seen in relation to the type of mechanism being dis-
cussed. As it appears from the interviews, there are many different Ombuds-type mecha-
nisms that could be contemplated. Diagram 1 sets out a spectrum of possible options. 
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Diagram 1. Spectrum of options
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On the left of the spectrum are options that rely entirely on voluntary commitments, 
and an inter-governmental body set up under a new international treaty is found on 
the right of the spectrum. In between, other options include setting up a national 
NGO or private organisation authorised by national law, an individual donor mech-
anism that draws its authority from funding agreements, a Joint Sectoral Ombuds 
underpinned by donor funding requirements and a mechanism set up under an exist-
ing inter-governmental body such as the UN that would acquire a legal basis through 
a resolution of that body. This latter option was mentioned in a few interviews and 
resonates with calls from external sources for the set-up of independent tribunals in 
response to allegations of abuse in the aid sector.24
The different options require different prerequisites to be set up and vary in terms of 
how easily they can be done in terms of the international buy-in required and the 
cost and complexity in setting them up. For instance, it would be possible to set up a 
national NGO, but it would lack authority over NGOs and multilaterals working in an 
international space. In contrast, a new inter-governmental body would have the legal 
authority of all governments who sign up to it, but time and effort would be required 
to solicit this level of international support given the sovereignty issues involved. In 
addition, although the mechanisms towards the right of the spectrum have more 
legal authority, their scope is usually fragmented in terms of the types of issues they 
deal with (e.g. criminal or civil only) or the types of organisations they cover (e.g. the 
UN or NGOs). Even the strongest legal responses to the right of the spectrum would 
not be a complete answer and would inevitably need to be part of a broader package 
of responses.
Oversight mechanisms, such as reporting hotlines, are already utilised by some do-
nors, including USAID and DFID. In a similar way, an independent aid Ombuds could 
be set up by one donor alone to cover its own aid programmes, perhaps by em-
bedding this mechanism in its own national Ombuds institutions. The Joint Sectoral 
Ombuds in the middle of the spectrum can be seen as an extension of this model. It 
would be a joint mechanism of donors and implementing agencies. It would draw on 
voluntary agreement, moral pressure and donor conditionality as its base of authority.
24 See, for example, Bradlow, 2016
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6.1  Joint Sectoral Aid Ombuds
Even though the range of mechanisms described in Diagram 1 were referred to in 
interviews, many interviews converged towards the model of a Joint Sectoral Aid 
Ombuds. This is larger than a single donor or agency, without requiring the long-term 
preparation and buy-in of an international legal mechanism. Although it lacks direct 
control over organisations (and certainly has none over the individuals employed 
by those organisations), it has the capacity to take a holistic view and make recom-
mendations that cover all types of organisations (NGOs and multilaterals) and may 
respond to all aspects of a case (civil and/or criminal). It also has the advantage that 
affected people who want to file a complaint can address this Ombuds without hav-
ing to navigate a narrowly defined Ombuds mechanism belonging to one agency or 
donor. Because it is a joint effort, there is power in the collective, as one interviewee 
put it: 
[…] It will only work if there is power in the collective; there has to be some 
sort of collective agreement to use it, not only two countries, so that funders 
can jointly leverage their aid.
6.2  Soft power is also power
In the review of the Ombuds role in Chapter 2, it was found that most Ombuds-type 
mechanisms, even those grounded in law, rely mainly on soft power. Nonetheless, 
there are different ways in which an Ombuds can command power.
Donors can use financial incentives and restrict or cut the budgets of agencies that 
repeatedly fail to respond adequately to cases of abuse. Besides the option of the 
financial incentive, the Ombuds would have a certain amount of ‘moral’ authority. For 
the interviewees from aid organisations, the moral pressure was complementary to 
the financial incentive and was comprised of different aspects.
One of these aspect was peer pressure – with a focus on encouraging increased 
collective capacity and responsibility in the sector, such as through joint complaint 
mechanisms, and strengthening peer support, learning and pressure. The threat of 
negative publicity would be a constant, but this would be coupled with enough over-
sight to ensure transparency by organisations, so inadequacies could not be hidden 
away. Reputational risk should also be understood as a risk to an organisation’s ability 
to negotiate access in the field, locally and nationally, and so this idea is not solely 
about potential loss of funding. In the end, organisations may work harder to ensure 
that cases do not go to the Ombuds if faced with the triple punch of moral pressure 
coupled with reputational and financial risk. Perhaps unsurprisingly, for many humani-
tarian and development managers, such moral pressure would also be s useful within 
their own organisations to encourage a positive change in mind-set.
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7.  Working components and operational aspects 
In this chapter, we will review a number of pertinent questions with regard to a possi-
ble International Aid Ombuds, exploring which organisations are overseen; the scope 
of issues; which individuals are covered; whether it would be an international mech-
anism and/or have a national presence; the roles of the possible Ombuds; issues of 
ownership, governance, and the role of national institutions; and where the possible 
mechanism could be nested as well as costing issues.
7.1  Which organisations are covered?
To which organisations would the International Aid Ombuds apply? There was con-
sensus in the interviews that the Ombuds needs to apply to all aid actors in humani-
tarian and development settings – (I)NGOs, the UN, the Red Cross, private organisa-
tions and donors. It could also pertain to actors surrounding aid operations, such as 
research institutions, universities, consulting firms and media outfits. This introduces 
some challenges in terms of how different organisations would come under the 
purview of a potential aid Ombuds. An Ombuds that relies primarily on donor fund-
ing as a tool of conditionality would depend on agreements between donors and 
grant-holders. Although these agreements may vary considerably, they would none-
theless provide a means for the Ombuds to exercise oversight over a range of organi-
sations. Other organisations that do not receive donor funding, or that fall under other 
donor oversight modalities, might have a different relationship with the Ombuds. 
There might also be space for voluntary commitment to the mechanism.
(I)NGOs and the Red Cross
In the case of (I)NGOs, collaboration with the Ombuds would be based primarily on 
individual agency commitment and sector-wide peer pressure. The authority of the 
Ombuds could also be strengthened by incorporating it into grant or partnership 
agreements between donors and grant-holders. Donors that currently have their 
own oversight mechanisms incorporate these into their agreements in varying ways, 
and such provisions could be extended to the Ombuds. For instance, some funding 
agreements include mandatory reporting requirements when incidents arise, the pub-
licising of the availability of donor reporting lines to staff and aid recipients, the right 
to intervene and investigate when things go wrong, and, under some jurisdictions, the 
right to direct remedial action.
Multilaterals
A key question is how the Ombuds would apply to multilaterals and whether immu-
nity provisions would be a barrier here. Certainly, the support of (I)NGO interviewees 
who were in favour of the Ombuds idea was strongly conditional on its coverage 
including the UN. These interviewees said that NGOs should not be singled out if mul-
tilaterals escape the mechanism’s scrutiny.
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UN immunity25 is a complex area of law, but, from a pragmatic perspective, it is pos-
sible to assume that there should be few difference in terms of the application of the 
Ombuds to the UN or NGOs for the following reasons:
• Requirements to cooperate with the Ombuds could be included by donors in 
all types of funding agreements, whether these are formal contracts with private 
organisations, grant agreements with NGOs or memoranda of understanding with 
multilateral agencies.
• The Ombuds role is to make recommendations, not to override the authority of 
the organisation itself to act, and immunity is therefore not threatened. In addition, 
Ombuds usually work, as stated in Chapter 2, as a last resort, after internal mecha-
nisms have had a reasonable opportunity to address the issue in hand.
• There are signals that the UN itself does not consider its immunity to be absolute, 
especially in cases of SEA.26
• The UN has stated that it is open to cooperation with external inspectors (‘Com-
mit to joint investigations with the United Nations or with independent, external 
experts so as to enhance transparency’ 27) and joint donor/UN investigations have 
happened in practice.28
• Donors may give preferential treatment to organisations that are willing to coope-
rate with an Ombuds and favour them when awarding grants, particularly for com-
petitive project funding. This could be part of the risk assessments typically carried 
out before awarding funds.29 
Organisations outside of the International Aid Ombuds authority
Another question that arises is how the Ombuds would deal with complaints about 
entities that are not covered by voluntary commitment or through donor require-
ments, for instance, the many organisations and activities that are not funded by 
donors participating in the International Aid Ombuds. The Ombuds would still have 
the ability to make enquiries, assist the complainant in finding a pathway to raise 
concerns, and intervene on their behalf with the organisations involved. Even in cases 
where it has no direct authority, the Ombuds would not be prevented from looking 
into a case and could make its findings public to add pressure to its recommenda-
tions. In a similar way, although it is not envisaged that the Ombuds would apply to 
peacekeeping operations because of the different lines of accountability going back 
to UN Member States, it could still assist with individual cases to the extent possible.
25 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly on 13 Feb-
ruary 1946
26 See, for example, UN, 2008, paragraph 12.; UN Member State calls for prosecution of perpetrators in UN sixth 
committee, 72nd session 2017; data on case-handling in UN, A/71/818, pp. 42-65; as well as citations of UN com-
mitments in ‘AIDS-free World 2018 Primer’, although the same document claims that the UN has not always been 
forthcoming on waiving immunity in practice.
27 UN SG report - A/71/818 46, p. 15, (ix)
28 See for example, USAID OIG, Semi-annual Report to Congress 2018, p. 30 ‘A joint OIG investigation with the 
UNDP Office of Audit and Investigation found indications of fraud and corruption in an Iraqi stabilization project’.
29 See, for example, Semi-annual Report to Congress 2018, p. 32, ‘USAID’s Assistance to Public International Organi-
zations This audit will determine what assessment of risks USAID’s offices are conducting before awarding funds 
to public international organizations, and how the offices mitigate risks they identify. The audit will also determine 
how public international organization programs and funds are overseen by USAID’s offices and whether other 
vulnerabilities exist with this type of assistance’.
Mention should be made of the role of national authorities in the functioning of an 
Ombuds mechanism. As conceived, the Ombuds would cover abuse perpetrated by 
aid workers working for aid agencies but would not investigate complaints against 
those working for government agencies, as these people should be covered by do-
mestic systems. Grey areas may be envisaged, however, where aid agency personnel 
and government employees work in close proximity, such as in a Ministry of Health 
hospital or when government services are funded by international donors. It may also 
be feasible for a national government to seek the advice or services on an Interna-
tional Aid Ombuds in cases where abuse is suspected among agencies contracted by 
the government for service delivery. As the focus of the Ombuds is to provide a voice 
and right of appeal to victims of abuse, the mechanism would have to remain flexible 
enough to adequately handle cases falling in such grey areas, by entering into dia-
logue and coordination with the appropriate mechanisms in situ.
Chain responsibility
Chain responsibility refers to the extent to which primary grant recipients, such as the 
UN and (I)NGOs, are held accountable for the actions of their implementing partner 
organisations, such as NGO or private-sector service deliverers. Efforts to strengthen 
this chain responsibility have increased recently. For instance, the UN is in the pro-
cess of issuing the ‘United Nations Protocol on Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse Involving Implementing Partners’, which sets out obligations to report all inci-
dents and reserves the right of the UN to take over an investigation involving down-
stream partners.
As mentioned above, a potential Ombuds could investigate complaints about every 
aid provider within and outside of its authority, while aiming to strengthen existing 
mechanisms and acting as a last resort. In the case of chain responsibility, the Om-
buds could particularly add value by ensuring a coordinated response in the delivery 
chain whereby one credible enquiry/investigation is carried out for all parties con-
cerned (local agency, international NGO or multilateral organisation, and donors). This 
is important to safeguard victims/survivors from repeat investigations. The harmoni-
sation and integration of responses helps to minimise transaction costs and drives up 
efficiency. The role of intake and disposition by an Ombuds is therefore useful in such 
circumstances and builds on what is already happening between some donors when 
cases arise. An Ombuds could avoid or reduce the duplication of responses to com-
plaints in larger organisations and identify the necessary structures and resources in 
the chain to assist smaller aid agencies/NGOs. A cautionary view expressed by many 
was that small, local NGOs should not be penalised for their lack of resources, but 
should, in the first instance, be adequately supported in developing their capacity for 
preventing and responding to abuse.
7.2  Which issues are addressed?
In terms of the focus of the mechanism, there was a mixed response. Some argued 
for SEA to be a priority, as one of the most serious and neglected types of miscon-
duct by aid workers. Others suggested stretching the focus to cover other types of 
misconduct against aid recipients, such as violence, physical harm, discrimination, 
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bullying, withholding of aid and other types of abuses. Fraud/corruption might also be 
covered, although these issues are well-addressed by other processes. A few respon-
dents mentioned including safety and security concerns, but most felt these would 
be outside the scope of an Ombuds mechanism. The calls for a narrow focus were 
largely because of concerns that the Ombuds would become challenged and over-
stretched with too wide a remit.
However, others argued that the Ombuds must be open to all complaints in order to 
be responsive to community concerns; these may include abuse and exploitation, but 
also complaints about the quality of aid. As one interviewee said, it is not for us as an 
international community to determine what constitutes the worst form of abuse: ‘The 
mechanism should be open to any individual who does not feel heard’.
If the remit were too specific, there would be a risk of under-use, and the mechanism 
would become too bureaucratic and soon lose people’s confidence if it were to turn 
away complainants. As one participant said,
If someone comes forward with a complaint that is not resolved at field level, 
it is not possible to say you won’t deal with it. If you have an Ombudsman, it 
has to deal across the board; it can’t take one thing and not another.
Making the mechanism open for all kinds of complaints is also in keeping with the 
way other Ombuds usually work.
To keep the scope manageable, interviewees suggested staggering the process, for 
instance, time-wise, by starting with a narrower function focused on SEA and then 
broadening the focus over time. An alternative identified was being open and inclusive 
from the start but prioritising certain types of complaints (e.g. SEA) and having differ-
ent ways of filtering and channelling other types of complaints, including by referring 
complainants to other complaints mechanisms and accompanying them through 
these processes.
7.3  Who is covered?
In terms of who should have recourse to the Ombuds, there was consensus that 
the mechanism needed to be for aid recipients and affected populations rather than 
agency personnel (staff or volunteers) raising concerns on their own behalf. The 
rationale for this was the need to be available for those who had no other recourse, 
‘complaints that fall through the cracks’, whereas agency staff members are covered 
by other mechanisms (legal contracts, trade unions, organisational Ombuds, ethics 
offices, etc.). In view of the principle of exhausting other mechanisms first, the Inter-
national Aid Ombuds would not normally be open to workplace concerns raised by 
staff members, although there may be exceptions, for instance, in the case of low-
er-level local staff without contracts and those working on a completely voluntary 
basis.
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7.4  Accessibility: an international and/or national mechanism?
An important question is whether the potential independent aid Ombuds would be 
positioned internationally, or whether it would also avail itself of national offices. This 
relates to the important challenge facing the Ombuds in terms of how to make itself 
accessible to those who need its help.
Accessibility was a common concern among interviewees, who found the idea of a 
vulnerable person in Africa accessing a remote body in a Northern capital ‘fanciful’. It 
is worth noting that this issue is not only related to geographical remoteness; accessi-
bility concerns are faced by all systems of protection aiming to find out about vulner-
able persons who are suffering abuse. Many interviewees stressed the need for acces-
sibility. There is wide agreement that people who feel abused must be able to find a 
safe space, will require face-to-face contact and should be able to speak in their own 
language. The human touch is important in communication, particularly in cultures 
oriented more towards verbal communication, and it is necessary to take differences 
in cultural understanding into account in terms of whether and how to raise con-
cerns. Some people mentioned that, even within one country, to be truly accessible, 
an Ombuds would require multiple facilities, considering distance, language and other 
factors. In addition, any system must consider the security of complainants, ensuring 
complete confidentiality and addressing the inherent risks in the reporting on such 
sensitive subjects as SEA.
The idea of an aid Ombuds with one or multiple offices in all countries where aid is 
delivered raised immediate concerns in the interviews in terms of the scalability of 
such a model, given the costs, logistics, issues of national laws and jurisdiction, and 
the bureaucracy involved. There is also the concern that such an office might replace 
or duplicate complaint mechanisms that are already in place in the country and within 
aid operations.
If the Ombuds is limited to an international office, this would nonetheless have an 
added value and potential impact in a number of ways, even in individual cases:
• In accordance with standard Ombuds practice, the Independent Aid Ombuds can 
operate as an appeal mechanism, where organisations and joint complaints me-
chanisms (where they exist) are the direct contact. The Ombuds may play a role in 
strengthening, or overseeing, these country-level mechanisms.
• The Ombuds should nonetheless be accessible to people and have the capaci-
ty to investigate individual cases when necessary. The Ombuds would need to 
set up different methods of access and publicise these, for example, by requiring 
grantees to advertise in aid delivery sites through posters (e.g. in hospitals), leaflets 
(e.g. in packages) and outreach work involving talking with staff and members of 
the public in aid-receiving communities and/or through a network of in-country 
supporters promoting its work, including through activities on awareness of rights, 
communication and consultations.
• Learning from existing Ombuds mechanisms around the world that deal with 
vulnerable people shows the importance of enabling and/or encouraging others 
to complain on behalf of the affected person. It is therefore envisaged in this case 
that the complaint may come from a staff member, a visiting consultant, a donor 
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or other persons in the locality with the ability to report, rather than from the vulne-
rable person him- or herself.
Pilot countries?
An approach that has been suggested is for the Ombuds to start with work in pilot 
countries. This requires further consideration but could involve the following alterna-
tives:
Option 1: This could involve the initiation of country-level Ombuds offices in a number 
of pilot countries for a period of several years as branches of an international office. 
This would put the Ombuds in the position of being on the ground, with the ability 
to receive complaints directly from affected populations and work to resolve them. 
Taking this approach could help to intensify the strengthening of country-level mech-
anisms, enable testing of how accessibility operates for the Ombuds, and provide an 
opportunity to innovate and enhance the possible work of an aid Ombuds.
Option 2: The international Ombuds could be located in an international office only 
but work with priority countries through regular visits, with a particular focus on 
strengthening complaint mechanisms and investigations within existing structures and 
aid agencies, rather than being a primary receiver and resolver of complaints.
7.5  Roles of Aid Ombuds
The possible aid Ombuds could play a number of roles. This section will present these 
different roles and explore how they could be executed, based on feedback from 
interviewees and a review of experiences of Ombuds worldwide.
Responsive role
The responsive role of dealing with complaints is at the heart of an Ombuds function. 
It was mentioned previously that an Ombuds needs to be people-centred and open 
for all complaints. At the same time, the Ombuds can have priorities, such as SEA and 
other direct forms of abuse. This means that responding to complaints must be wider 
than investigating and also incorporates channelling functions to advise complainants 
about where to bring their complaint and/or inform those responsible about the com-
plaint.
The interviewees were generally in agreement that having the Ombuds as an appeal 
function after existing channels were exhausted was the best use of the mechanism 
and the most fair to organisations, as it allowed them a chance to resolve complaints 
first while also giving complainants further recourse if necessary. This would imply a 
scaled problem-solving approach that first involves assessing complaints, filtering out 
malicious complaints and channelling concerns falling out of the priority remit of the 
Ombuds to the appropriate mechanisms. Second, once the validity and relevance of 
the complaint has been established, the Ombuds would ask organisations if they have 
investigated and, if so, review their investigation; if the organisation has not investigat-
ed, it may ask them to conduct an investigation under the oversight of the Ombuds. 
Finally, the Ombuds may directly investigate where it has the authority to do so. Ad-
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ditionally, although the Ombuds would serve as a last resort, it was noted that timeli-
ness is an important factor, and the Ombuds may need to intervene at earlier stages if 
organisations’ internal processes are taking too long.
Part of the responsive role is the question of follow-up. In line with common practice, 
if a determination is made against an organisation in terms of the way it has handled 
complaints, the Ombuds would make advisory findings and non-binding recommen-
dations, as it has no direct control over organisations or individuals. It would rely on 
the agency concerned to take follow-up measures (e.g. dismissing or sanctioning 
perpetrators, making referrals for criminal prosecution to national authorities, offering 
remedial support to victims/survivors, etc). Again, a scaled approach may be required, 
which involves first making recommendations, then monitoring whether the recom-
mendations are followed up, and third, in case the agency has not responded ade-
quately, escalate sanctions, for example by making the findings public or recommend-
ing that donors apply financial penalties. There were repeated calls from a range of 
interviewees for donors to apply conditionality in this way and use funding as a tool to 
enforce compliance by organisations, as the following typical comment illustrats:
Donor involvement is the only thing that will make a difference; it is not until 
donors withhold funding that we will see a change in organisational behavi-
our.
There are different approaches to publicity as a sanction. Ombuds are seen to de-
ploy a spectrum of responses, ranging from discreet resolution to public naming and 
shaming. Some only publish cases that are not resolved adequately, whereas others 
publicise all admissible cases as a matter of course, irrespective of their findings. There 
are pros and cons to each policy: The first policy enables publicity to be used as a tool 
of compliance. It also avoids agencies being affected by publicity when complaints are 
found to be ungrounded after investigation. The latter policy avoids the politicisation 
of decisions about publication. Most interviewees were of the view that publicity is an 
important sanction, providing it is used carefully and only in cases of non-compliance 
in order to avoid detrimental effects.
Where complaints concern criminal acts that constitute violations of national laws, 
rather than misconduct breaching aid standards and employment contracts, questions 
are raised about referring alleged perpetrators/cases to national police authorities. 
Most interviewees had reservations and would prefer a discretionary approach that 
considered the capacities of national criminal justice systems, human rights issues 
and the views of the victim/survivor on a case-by-case basis. A ‘do no harm’ approach 
was advised, where referrals to the police should not do more harm than good to the 
victim/survivor of abuse or discrimination. Although the Ombuds would not directly 
report a case (unless required to do so by law), it could assist in making an objective 
analysis based on an assessment of criminal justice systems and other issues to allow 
for a systematic and consistent response. The involvement of the Ombuds could help 
guard against organisational interests blocking victims/survivors from reporting cases 
to authorities, which is a concern for some stakeholders.30
 
30 See also recent cases – Newsclick, 18 August 2018; Newsweek, 7 and 10 August and 29 September 2018
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Proactive role
In addition to the responsive role of a possible aid Ombuds, there was strong support 
for other roles. A proactive role and an ability to act on its own initiative rather than 
wait for complaints to come in was considered important. This could include, for 
example, conducting audits of the complaints mechanisms of individual agencies or 
thematic evaluations in specific locations to see how individual and joint complaints 
mechanisms are functioning and whether they are adequately responding to the 
needs of communities. Such visits could also include outreach work to proactively 
inform communities and staff about the availability of the mechanism. These activi-
ties would need to avoid duplicating the work of existing initiatives. For instance, the 
Humanitarian Quality Assurance Initiative carries out audits of CHS Alliance mem-
bers against the CHS standard, which includes the aspect of complaint mechanisms; 
hence, the Ombuds would focus on complaint mechanisms of other agencies or a 
review of the sector overall. The Ombuds could also proactively launch an investi-
gation, for example when multiple cases are reported from a particular area and it is 
feared that these signal a much wider problem.
Advisory role and capacity development
The Ombuds could play an advisory role in terms of analysing trends in the sector 
through its own data analysis and annual reporting as well as commissioning other 
research. It could also play a convening and harmonisation role, for example through 
standard setting on investigations, as it appears there are no common recognised 
standards for investigations. Another issue highlighted was the difference in the 
burden of proof used by different decision-making bodies and external tribunals. The 
Ombuds could also map and seek to understand accountability mechanisms and reg-
ulatory frameworks worldwide and engage in capacity development and the promo-
tion of good practices.
7.6  Reliance on first-tier mechanisms
The way Ombuds normally work – and may feasibly work in the aid sector – is as a 
second-tier appeal mechanism (as a last resort within reasonable limits). This means 
that the Ombuds largely relies on the presence of first-tier mechanisms. These are 
complaint mechanisms within agencies or joint inter-agency complaint mechanisms. 
A model like this, which operates as a second-tier/final-resort complaints system, as is 
the case with most Ombuds, requires a first-tier system that is up and running in order 
to work to optimum effect.
A key challenge facing the set-up of an Ombuds is the current state of complaints 
mechanisms in the sector. Much remains to be done in terms of ensuring organisa-
tions have functioning complaints mechanisms in place. The present situation is also 
fluid, as much work is being done in the wake of the safeguarding scandal earlier 
this year and with the Global Safeguarding Conference planned for October 2018. It 
is therefore important that the International Aid Ombuds is complementary to other 
initiatives, able to adapt to the evolving context and capable of playing multiple roles.
It is foreseen that, in a first phase of the initiative, while responding to individual cases 
plays a role, there would be greater emphasis on the Ombuds’ proactive and advisory 
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functions, with the aim of stimulating and supporting the establishment of individu-
al and joint complaints mechanisms in the sector. Activities in this first phase could 
therefore involve capacity development/training on good practices in setting up 
complaints mechanisms, auditing of existing complaints mechanisms, and field visits 
to particular locations to evaluate existing individual and joint complaints mechanisms 
in order to see how they are meeting the concerns of aid recipients, with a view to 
strengthening such mechanisms as necessary. The first phase would also involve con-
tinued development of the overall Ombuds function. This phase would then give way 
incrementally to an increased focus on the responsive side, where complaints could 
be received on an appeal basis; this would signal a second phase, where the Ombuds 
would be fully operational.
7.7  Ownership, governance and the role of national institutions
Interviewees emphasised the need for a multi-stakeholder approach, which includes 
donors, host countries and agencies (INGOs and NGOs, multilaterals and the private 
sector) themselves. One way of bringing in this wide ownership would be through a 
governance structure comprised of representatives from all parts of the sector.
At the same time, interviewees pointed to the need for donors to take a proactive role 
in initiating the mechanism and actively promoting it. This would strengthen the basis 
of the model that builds on donor funding as one of its principle sources of authority.
The question of how the entity would link to national and regional structures was also 
often raised in the interviews. There has been a concern that an international Om-
buds mechanism would unduly interfere with national laws and bodies. This concern 
would be borne out if a mechanism were created in international law with the aim of 
having direct sanctioning capacity. An aid Ombuds mechanism that is sectoral and re-
lies on recommendations as outlined above and derives its mandate from the existing 
authority of donors and the voluntary commitment of aid agencies would have less 
risk of being seen as interfering.
Interviewees found it important to coordinate the aid Ombuds mechanism closely 
with national institutions, as they have a legitimate stake in the process. It was also felt 
that a lack of coordination would serve to foster a negative atmosphere and lead to 
distrust between governments and aid actors. It is foreseen that the Ombuds could 
bolster national institutions, which may have reservations about raising complaints 
concerning large international institutions on which they rely for funding and support.
The study suggested that the creation of formal links between the Ombuds and 
national authorities would lead to complexities in terms of the application of different 
national laws and relations with diverse institutions in different places with varying 
roles and capacities. A one-size-fits-all approach seems unlikely to work in terms of 
forging links; rather, relationships could be explored on a case-by-case basis, and, 
where possible, associations could be developed with national-level Ombuds, human 
rights institutions and the like.
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7.8  Nesting and networking
As detailed in the section on the need for an International Aid Ombuds, interviewees contend-
ed that such a mechanism should build on and strengthen existing and evolving national and 
international standards, initiatives and mechanisms.
In line with this, there was a great deal of emphasis in responses to creating something ‘light-
touch’ and ‘flexible’ that builds on existing mechanisms and allows them space to function. 
There was little desire to set up a large new bureaucracy with offices in every country. It was 
suggested that the structure could be based on sector agreements such as Good Humanitar-
ian Donorship or the Grand Bargain, peace-mediation or special rapporteur models. A light-
weight model such as this would require a small secretariat but could be agile in operation by 
having a flexible workforce comprised of technical experts and country-level specialists avail-
able on call as needed. The organisation would also need to ensure a fair representation of 
different parts of the sector and the Global North and South, both in the governance structure 
and in working-level technical expertise.
Consideration was also given as to which organisation could provide a secretariat function for 
the possible International Aid Ombuds. Nesting could be considered, not only for practical rea-
sons, but also to signal the status and credibility of the body. In view of the latter, the choice 
of the nesting location is an important issue. Nesting the Ombuds in an individual donor or aid 
agency, for example, would fail to signal its sectoral character. The complexities of setting up 
and managing an International Aid Ombuds also imply that the nesting location should be a 
substantial organisation with the in-house legal, financial and organisational expertise needed 
to carry out such a function.
Various suggestions were put forward:
• Existing sectoral coordination mechanisms were one option. There was little support 
among interviewees for the UN/IASC, despite its recognisable technical knowledge on 
accountability to affected populations and sexual exploitation and abuseA, mostly because 
it was not seen by participants as sufficiently independent and effectual. As for NGO coor-
dination bodies such as the CHS Alliance, these would not cover all parts of the sector (i.e. 
multilaterals, private entities) and might be constrained by their membership from imposing 
strong sanctions such as publicity or recommending the withdrawal of funding.
• A donor coordination mechanism, such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship network or 
the OECD/Development Assistance Committee (DAC), was viewed as a possibility, provided 
there is a means of engaging other players in the sector (host governments, NGOs, the UN, 
the private sector, etc.). OECD-DAC was mentioned by several interviewees as a well-regar-
ded technical body with experience in standard-setting (and currently working on an in-
strument for development cooperation on PSEA). This choice would come with the risk of 
being seen as too oriented towards Northern donors, but this may be resolved by a broad, 
sectoral governance structure for the Ombuds mechanism.
• Evolving architecture on SEA, such as the International Centre for Safeguarding Excellence 
that is currently being scoped by DFID, was another possibility. It is uncertain how this will 
develop and how it would be compatible with the scope of an Ombuds that is not restric-
ted to SEA.
• Nesting in an Ombuds network or umbrella body could be explored, but the capacity of 
such bodies to administer logistics and manage security and other risks associated with 
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implementing activities in challenging contexts may be an issue.
• An arbitration body might be explored, for example, the Permanent Court of Arbitrati-
on, which covers mass civil claims including claims about land rights. This body’s re-
mit is limited to civil rather than criminal issues, which would not cover the full scope 
of responses an Ombuds might wish to consider.
• Other suggestions made by the interviewees, namely the International Criminal Court 
and the International Court of Justice, were not applicable given the nature of the 
cases of concern vs. the mandates of the institutions.
The scoping study has not yielded a specific recommendation for nesting, and different 
options may need to be explored further, also depending on the willingness of the rele-
vant bodies to develop and host a potential International Aid Ombuds.
7.9  Costing
 Considerations as to the cost of running an Ombuds mechanism have not formed part of 
this initial scoping study. Nonetheless, costing came up in interviews, and some general 
remarks can be made beyond the truism that accountability costs money.
As related above, most interviewees favoured a lightweight, agile structure that builds on 
existing initiatives and functions with a minimal secretariat and a flexible on-demand ros-
ter of specialists. Although there are multiple reasons for this preference, costing is part 
of the consideration. Costing also appears heavily in the deliberations about whether the 
mechanism will rely on an international office alone, or whether (some) country-based 
offices should be part of it.
Interviewees expected donors to bear the costs of the mechanism, rather than build on 
membership fees. To protect its independence, the mechanism cannot be fully mem-
bership-based (i.e. statements of collaboration, but not membership, can link agencies 
to the mechanism). The model envisages working in such a way that agencies resolve 
issues through their own investigations and enquiries at their own cost first, giving way 
to intervention by the Ombuds and potential sanctions if issues remain unresolved.
Even though the initial investment in the Ombuds may be relatively modest, broader 
investment in agency or inter-agency complaint mechanisms remains paramount to 
ensure that the Ombuds can have its envisaged role as a second-tier mechanism.
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8.  Proposed model for an international 
 aid ombuds
There are many ways in which an International Aid Ombuds could be shaped. In the 
previous chapters, we have reviewed the spectrum of possible options and a large 
number of the basic working components and practical aspects that could make up 
the International Aid Ombuds. A number of these aspects yielded different answers, 
leaving some questions open, such as the issue of nesting and the question of wheth-
er country-based offices would be required and feasible. However, on the whole, our 
findings were sufficiently convergent and consistent to allow us to propose a model 
for an International Aid Ombuds. The suggested model, which captures the elements 
discussed above, is set out in Diagram 2. The model illustrates a joint sectoral entity 
that complements and strengthens existing accountability mechanisms, is nested in 
an international body and governed by different parts of the sector, with the work car-
ried out by a small secretariat supported by a flexible roster of technical experts and 
on-the-ground specialists.
Diagram 2. International Aid Ombuds
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8.1  Multi-tier complaints model
The model that is proposed works on the basis of a multi-tier complaint system, 
where the International Aid Ombuds operates as an appeal mechanism, even though 
it can also be approached directly by complainants. This is represented in Diagram 3.
Diagram 3. Multi-tier complaints
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9.  Conclusions
This study was commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to solicit 
opinions about the idea of an Ombuds for humanitarian and development aid and to 
scope the contours of what such a mechanism might possibly look like. In the course 
of the study, 76 individuals were consulted, representing donors, host governments, 
the UN, (I)NGOs, the Red Cross, standard and quality agencies, and persons with spe-
cialist knowledge relevant to the study.
A major finding was that the vast majority of interviewees support the idea of an inde-
pendent International Aid Ombuds (even though cautionary remarks were also made). 
The need for this mechanism has become apparent because of the attention to 
sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment in the first half of 2018. However, it seems 
that, for many interviewees, the idea of the International Aid Ombuds as an external 
oversight entity also represents a natural next step for a sector that has been investing 
in policies and mechanisms for accountability and complaint handling for several de-
cades. The Ombuds could give an added impetus to the more adequate application 
of existing mechanisms in order to enhance good and safe programming.
A second major finding was that there is a broad consensus that, although an aid Om-
buds must be a joint effort of the entire sector and aid chain, there is a need for do-
nors to enhance such a mechanism by initiating it and by encouraging its use through 
conditional funding and financial incentives.
It is important to emphasise that the interviewees were invited to share their personal 
opinions, rather than reflect their organisation’s perspective. Without a clear proposi-
tion of what an aid Ombuds may look like, it would be premature to seek such official 
opinions. Although the consent of the sector can therefore not be predicted on the 
basis of this study, the two major findings were very strong and were found across the 
different groups of participants in the study.
The study further explored what an International Aid Ombuds might look like by 
reviewing existing practices and soliciting opinions of the participants about different 
aspects that are important for the functioning of such a mechanism, including its 
authority base, the scope of issues to be covered, who is covered, whether it would 
be an international mechanism and/or have a national presence, its roles, issues of 
ownership and governance, nesting of the mechanism and costing.
Different options for an International Aid Ombuds were identified. These options differ 
in terms of their source of authority. They also have different characteristics with re-
gard to the buy-in and preparation process required to set them up, the likelihood of 
producing timely results and dealing with large volumes of complaints, the ability to 
combine different roles, and the level of cost and bureaucracy.
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 Challenges
The study identified various challenges to setting up an Ombuds. Beyond obvious 
and important practical challenges revolving around the logistics and administration 
of such a mechanism, there are a number of other sets of challenges that must be 
considered.
A key challenge is developing the entity in such a way that voluntary commitments, 
donor requirements and moral pressure, as instruments available to the Ombuds to 
apply pressure on agencies, add up to a mechanism that is sufficiently weighty to en-
sure proper follow-up of complaints in order to meet the expectations of those who 
muster up the courage to file a complaint.
Another challenge concerns the management of the security of complainants and 
those involved with investigations, particularly given the sensitive nature of the themes 
concerned. Related to this are a number of legal and jurisdictional issues. How the 
Ombuds would link with domestic laws and relevant national authorities needs clarifi-
cation, particularly concerning criminal cases. Jurisdictions must be respected, but a 
‘do no harm’ approach to the victims/survivors must be ensured.
More fundamentally, the question of authority must be answered: From where does 
the authority of an Ombuds come? If it comes from the sector as a whole, then 
there must be a sufficient level of buy-in and continued support for the Ombuds. The 
mechanism cannot be viewed as just another ‘box-ticking’ exercise. The right balance 
must also be found between financial and moral incentives. In addition, even if it is 
considered to be a sector-wide mechanism, there will be organisations that choose 
not to actively support the Ombuds. The authority of the Ombuds over these organi-
sations must be clarified.
The right balance between passive and proactive roles must also be reached. Addi-
tionally, the Ombuds must not duplicate efforts, but rather coordinate with already-ex-
isting standards, mechanisms and processes, including national authorities. Related 
to this is the necessity of determining more precisely the scope of the Ombuds in 
order to clarify the standards it would work to support. One challenge here would 
be constraining the expansion of the scope of activities of the Ombuds beyond its 
agreed-upon focus.
Further, there are many challenges connected to accessibility and communication. 
Ways would have to be found to ensure that the existence and usefulness of the Om-
buds was properly communicated within the sector and – more importantly – to the 
recipients of aid. Many practical challenges concerning the language of communica-
tions and the means of appeal must be worked out. The aid sector is vast and deep, 
and all parts of the sector must be reached, down to the smallest local NGO.
A final challenge concerns expectations. Nurturing the initiative until it can fully fulfil 
its roles will be a long process. The full development, outreach and functionality of 
the Ombuds will take time. Clarity about its role, parameters and limitations are neces-
sary to avoid disillusion and disappointment.
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 Proposed model
On the basis of learning from other Ombuds functions, the discussions in the inter-
views, and the opportunities and challenges identified, the following model emerg-
es as the most feasible. We have provisionally labelled this option the Joint Sectoral 
Aid Ombuds.31 It is a joint sectoral entity that complements and strengthens existing 
accountability mechanisms, is nested in an international body and governed by differ-
ent parts of the sector, with the work carried out by a small secretariat supported by a 
flexible roster of technical experts and on-the-ground specialists.
Key characteristics of this proposed option are as follows:
• Its authority comes from voluntary commitment, peer pressure and agreement 
between donors and grantees.
• The Ombuds acts as an appeal function when first-tier complaints mechanisms 
have not been able to resolve an issue. In exceptional cases, for example when 
timeliness is critical, the Ombuds will take on a case as first or parallel responder.
• It builds on, collaborates with and strengthens existing standards and initiatives that 
foster accountability and aid agencies’ prevention of and response to abuse by their 
workers.
• It is open to all complaints from affected populations but prioritises SEA and other 
forms of abuse. It channels complaints outside of its priority areas to other mecha-
nisms.
• A primary role of the Ombuds is to respond to complaints. Responses and outco-
mes are scalable, and only when complaints are not adequately handled will investi-
gations be instigated.
• There is no direct authority to sanction. The Ombuds makes recommendations to 
the responsible agency, monitors follow-up and, in the case of lack of compliance, 
scales up to responses that may comprise publishing findings and recommending 
financial sanctions.
• Additional roles of the Ombuds are to proactively assess complaints mechanisms 
and their responsiveness to community needs and to provide advisory functions to 
develop capacity in the sector to prevent and address abuse.
Note that many of these characteristics could also be retained if such an Ombuds was 
initiated by a single donor operating alone, but the clear finding is that the power and 
authority of this mechanism comes from it being a joint enterprise.
The report identified a spectrum of possible options, ranging from voluntary stan-
dard-setting and compliance to an inter-governmental body with the specific focus 
and power to address issues of aid worker abuse. The proposition of this model is not 
to discount other mechanisms or, indeed, the different ways of setting up and de-
signing an Ombuds function. However, it is to recognise that the suggested approach 
offers the opportunity for flexibility, agility, relative ease of set-up and cost-effective-
ness, and a workaround to a number of complex challenges, particularly related to 
31 This is not a proposed name for the International Aid Ombuds. Indeed, the word ‘Ombuds’ itself lacks common un-
derstanding, and, as such, if this entity is set up, a more straightforward name that captures the idea of independent 
oversight of complaints may be considered.
41
legal jurisdiction. The proposed model, through its reliance on authority from donor 
agreements, voluntary participation and moral pressure and through its approach to 
working in a collaborative manner using non-binding recommendations, can help to 
provide oversight and direction for how complaints are handled in the sector with-
out the attendant complexities involved in seeking direct control.
While the study has led to a specific model, there are a number of issues that have 
not yielded a singular response. In particular, the different suggestions for nesting 
the international aid Ombuds require further exploration. A particularly complicated 
issue is the fact that an Ombuds – as an appeal mechanism – relies mainly on exist-
ing complaint mechanisms. These have not been developed in equal measure in all 
countries where aid operates. 
It is likely therefore that the first phase of the initiative would require a greater em-
phasis on the proactive function of stimulating and supporting the establishment 
of individual and joint complaints mechanisms in the sector. The first phase would 
then give way incrementally to an increased focus on the responsive side where 
complaints can be received on an appeal basis and thus a second phase where the 
Ombuds is fully operational. 
It is also worth noting that the situation is currently very fluid with various new 
initiatives emerging in light of the safeguarding scandal and October 2018 global 
safeguarding conference; as such the Ombuds initiative will need to fit with other 
activities in order to add value to a sector-wide strengthening of accountability.
Another issue to further explore is how the international aid Ombuds can effectively 
work in relation to country-based mechanisms, actors and authorities. While it is not 
considered feasible for several reasons to envisage national Ombuds offices, it may 
be worthwhile to explore an initial phase where the Ombuds focuses on a number 
of pilot countries. 
 Next steps
This initial scoping study has identified a need for an Ombuds-type mechanism for 
the aid sector and proposed a potential model which endeavours to work around 
many of the challenges facing the operation of such a mechanism. The testing of 
feasibility needs to continue into a further phase in terms of unpacking the mandate, 
structure and modalities of such a body and assessing the support of stakeholders. 
The next stages require further planning but may comprise the following elements:
• Identification of a potential nest for the international aid Ombuds enabling the 
nesting organisation concerned to play a role in preparing next steps.
• Further work to test and elaborate the proposed model in terms of its legal basis, 
organisational structure, costs, nesting etc. 
• It can be considered to do an assessment of the state of complaints mechanisms 
in the humanitarian and development sector. 
• Sector consultations to discuss the aid Ombuds idea among donors and aid 
agencies to garner institutional buy-in.
• Field work in a number of countries to test the feasibility of the international aid 
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Ombuds on the ground, to scope out how it can have optimal added value to 
existing mechanisms, possibly including a pilot run of the proposed model in 
locations where the first tier complaints mechanisms are sufficiently operational 
to trial a prototype mechanism for reporting and responding to complaints. 
• Consider setting up a prototype of the international aid Ombuds while garnering 
support for a broader mechanism, for instance, by working with interested agen-
cies and donors to set up a reporting hotline and testing methods for dealing 
with complaints received.
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 Background
In the wake of the recent scandals around humanitarian staff (sexual) misbehavior, in a 
number of countries discussions are taking place in the humanitarian and development 
sector on how to prevent or mitigate risks of future misconduct and how to react to mis-
conduct.
Many of the proposed steps focus on actions that organizations need to take within their 
organizations (code of conducts, whistleblowers, internal focal points). Some proposed ac-
tions relate to steps that the sector needs to take as a whole, such as the idea for a ‘huma-
nitarian passport’ and referencing system. Another action is to re-investigate the possibility 
of the creation of an independent mechanism, an ombudsman, to receive and investigate 
complaints from affected populations and from staff and to hold organizations accounta-
ble.
The idea of creating an ombudsman for humanitarian assistance was one of the recom-
mendations of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda after the genoci-
de in the mid-1990s. In 1997, at the World Disasters Forum, a decision was taken to sart a 
(three year) project to study the feasibility of adapting the ombudsman concept to the field 
of humanitarian assistance. The results of this study s were presented at a conference orga-
nized by IFRC in 2000.One of the results of the project was the creation of HAP (Humani-
tarian Accountability Partnership) in 2001. HAP decided to focus on the institutionalization 
of accountability systems within organizations and not to set up an independent structure. 
In 2015, HAP merged with People in Aid in what is now the Core Humanitarian Standard 
organization. The ‘ombudsman’ as collective and sector wide institution, however, never 
materialized. 
More recently, there have been a number of special mandate holders put in place in the UN 
system related to protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA). This includes the 
appointment of a Victims’ Rights Advocate for the UN and a Special Coordinator on impro-
ving the UN response to sexual exploitation and abuse.
In the aftermath of the ‘me too’ scandal, the idea to revitalize the ‘ombudsman’ concept 
came up32. This idea was discussed in meetings between development and humanitarian 
agencies and government officials, both in the Netherlands and in the UK. The ombudsman 
idea was also discussed in the ‘Safeguarding’ donor technical working group. It was agreed 
that the Netherlands would take the initiative to research the feasibility of an ombudsman
32 See the article by Dorothea Hilhorst, ‘aid agencies can’t police themselves. It’s time for a change’, IRIN 22 February 2018 
and John Mitchell and Ian Christoplos ‘a  Qual ombudsman revisited’, ALNAP blog 15 March 2018. See also the critical 
response to Hilhorst’ article by Gregory Gottlieb, ‘Opinion: how donors can address aid agency oversight’, IRIN, 8 March 
2018
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 Objectives for the scoping and feasibility research
• Study and capture the main lessons and challenges from the former ‘humanitarian 
ombudsman project’ and other (former and existing) projects/pilots around collec-
tive/system wide complaints and/or accountability mechanisms (ea. the current 
pilots around Protection Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in a number of 
countries);
• Identify pros and cons of an ombudsman for different actors, considering ea. the 
following questions, which will also help to inform the design of the ombudsman 
function:
• Should it have an advisory (i.e. ‘name and shame’) and arbitration, or and enfor-
cement function? (What are the pros and cons of each?)
• If enforcement – what are the legal barriers to its success? What jurisdiction 
could it have? What powers will it have and how will it enforce them? What legal 
structures will support its impartiality and independence? Could it investigate 
directly or should it act more like an arbitration service?
• How much leverage could it have over the UN system?
• Where would it sit? Who would it report to? What would be the costs?
• What are the political barriers/enablers to an ombudsman function?
• Investigate if there is support within the sector (UN, INGO’s, donors, NGO’s, go-
vernments, Red Cross & Crescent Movement and if possible (representatives of) 
affected populations for independent, sector wide complaints/accountability me-
chanisms;
• Recommend on whether to pursue the Ombudsman further and if so, in what 
form and with what scope33 and further steps to be taken. 
 Deliverables
A report with:
• Key lessons and recommendations from the former ombudsman project and other 
pilots/projects around independent, system wide accountability/complaints me-
chanisms;
• A description of the views and support of different actors in the sector on ‘indepen-
dent, sector wide’ accountability/complaint mechanisms;
• An advice on the scope or scopes of independent accountability mechanisms that 
might be successful;
• Advice on next steps. 
 Planning
• The scoping research should take place in the period June – August 2018
 Suggestions for the methodology
• Study of project documents, studies and literature related to the former (‘1997 – 
2000) humanitarian ombudsman’ project and other collective/system wide initiati-
ves around accountability and complaints;
33 E.g. issues of focus: both developmental and humanitarian work? (sexual) misconduct or a broader focus? (see 
for this question also IASC, Bets practice Guide: Inter-Agency Community Based Complaint Mechanism, p. 36 
ff). Issues around governance, mandate & competences (inform & investigate or/and sanctions/enforcement),  
accountability, balance between facilitation and regulation, jurisdiction, flexible/fit for context specific purpose, fi-
nances and costing, (geographical) structure of an Ombudsman system (national, regional, global office structure).
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• Interview people involved in former ‘ombudsman’ project and the follow up and 
people involved in other system wide initiatives (such as the IOM-led PSEA project);
• Contact and discuss the feasibility of or the functioning of an ombudsman with 
leadership within UN, INGO’s and NGO’s, Red Cross Movement, donors and gover-
nments and if possible (representatives of) affected populations;
• Contact and discuss it with the convenors of the Localization and Participation 
Revolution work streams of the Grand Bargain;
• Contact and discuss the concept with organizations specialized in accountabi-
lity and communicating with affected populations such as CHS Alliance, HQAI, 
Ground Truth, IASC AAP and PSEA Task team
 Budget for the study
To be defined
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